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THE 2016 AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL RULE 41:
NATIONAL SEARCH WARRANTS TO SEIZE
CYBERSPACE, "PARTICULARLY' SPEAKING
INTRODUCTION
"One may know how to conquer without being able to do it."'
George Orwell's dystopia, with the ever-watchful Big Brother,
has seemingly become a reality with the recently passed amend-
ments to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2
Rule 41, governing searches and seizures, now permits magis-
trate judges to authorize agents-under a single warrant-to
"remotely access," and simultaneously search, copy and seize in-
formation from an infinite number of unknown electronic devices
in multiple districts anywhere in the country.' The unlimited ju-
risdiction provision is triggered when a device's location is ob-
scured through "technological means," or if agents are investigat-
ing computer crimes in five or more districts4-regardless of
whether the locations of the innumerable search targets are
known. Absent clairvoyance, this begs the question of how Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements are applied to such a sweep-
ing search.
This comment examines this Fourth Amendment question
through a close analysis of hacking technology and the govern-
ment's technological response that has yet to appear before the
United States Supreme Court. It concludes that the expanded ju-
risdiction of federal warrants under revised Rule 41 can function
as a useful tool for combatting cybercrime and still satisfy the re-
1. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 35 (Lionel Giles trans., Global Grey 2013) (1910).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 34 (Kindle ed., Planet eBook 2004)
(1949) (describing a totalitarian state dictated by omnipresent government surveillance).
This novel coined the term "Big Brother," which has come to be associated with secret sur-
veillance. Id. at 3.
3. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6); id. 41(b)(6)(A)-(B) advisory committee notes (2016).
4. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A)-(B) (referencing the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), which makes computer "hacking" a crime).
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quirements of particularity and probable cause. However, to sat-
isfy those constitutional requirements, magistrates must limit
remote multi-computer searches to cases where it is likely that
any targeted computer is participating in criminal activity. Mag-
istrates will need to take particular care to limit searches that in-
trude on persons not involved in the unlawful activity that is the
object of the search.
Part I provides a survey of encryption and anonymization
technology universally employed by law-abiding citizens and
criminals alike. Part II details how law enforcement has, and
likely will, employ the techniques of computer hackers to circum-
vent these encryption technologies to conduct remote searches.
Part III outlines a history of how the Rule 41 amendments were
enacted. Part IV discusses the warrant for the largest hacking in-
vestigation and search in federal law enforcement history, Opera-
tion Pacifier. Included is an overview of federal court litigation
that challenged the validity of the warrant, which may be ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. Part V articulates and analyzes the
"reasonable expectation" of privacy component in the Fourth
Amendment as it relates to "remote access" searches. Part VI of-
fers judges and defense counsel a constitutional framework of
how to best assess probable cause and particularity in applica-
tions for remote access search warrants. Finally, Part VII con-
cludes with an assessment and outlook on the use of remote
searches and the need for judicial caution and attention to detail
under the updated Rule 41.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY AND
BACKGROUND
"If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained
you will also suffer a defeat."
Cyber security is currently a top priority for the United States,
as we now face sophisticated cyber threats from state-sponsored
hackers and organized cyber syndicates.6 However, the FBI has
5. TZU, supra note 1, at 34.
6. See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3-5 (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Director-
Comey-Statement.pdf.
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realized a growing gap in their pursuit of these cyber threats be-
cause these criminals are "Going Dark" and have become virtual-
ly invisible through the use of encryption based technology, which
forms an administrative hindrance for agents seeking search
warrants. The amendments to Rule 41 are aimed at addressing
these challenges, and apply in two circumstances: (1) where a
suspect has hidden the location of their computer using techno-
logical means, or (2) where the crime involves criminals hacking
computers located in five or more different judicial districts.! This
brings a large population of computer users within law enforce-
ment's reach as hacking crimes have become rampant in the news
and hiding a computer through technological means encompasses
a number of widely used anonymization technologies.
A. The New Barrier for Law Enforcement -Criminals "Going
Dark"
The movement to change Rule 41 is the product of advance-
ments in technology and changes in societal norms that have cre-
ated the proverbial perfect storm. We now carry on our lives in
the Internet of Things ("loT").9 At a limited cost, we now have the
means to connect any device with an on and off switch to the In-
ternet, including cell phones, coffee makers, washing machines,
wearable devices, the jet engines of an airplane, or the drill of an
oil rig.o Such a proliferation of technology connected to the ether
opposes general notions of privacy, extends the reach of surveil-
lance, and magnifies the potential for a breach of security. Crimi-
nals know this, and our increased reliance on technology has
spawned a new generation of technically affluent criminals who
have caused a rise in cybercrime."
7. Id.
8. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6); Leslie R. Caldwell, Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge
May Consider Warrants for Certain Remote Searches, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: JUSTICE
BLOGS (June 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opalblog/rule-41-changes-ensure-judge-
may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches.
9. KAREN ROSE ET AL., THE INTERNET OF THINGS: AN OVERVIEW 3, 11 (2015),
www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC-loT-overview-20151022.pdf (defining the
term "Internet of Things" and noting that "[t]he Internet of Things is happening now . .. a
revolutionary, fully connected 'smart' world").
10. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation Of 'The Internet Of Things,' FORBES (May
13, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explana
tion-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#33209d368284.
11. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 114-8, at 6 (2015).
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This creates a challenge for federal agents who now face a
modern criminal whose tools have evolved from a ski mask and
firearm. Today's criminal uses computers and mobile devices to
commit his crime. The black hats of today turn to cyber tools to
target United States' interests and facilitate theft, extortion and
other criminal activities.12 The drug lords of today supply criminal
enterprise with online storehouses hidden on the Dark Web, op-
erating like eBay, which buy and sell narcotics, explosives, pass-
ports and pornography." Rather than with brute force, vindictive
nation-states gain and use cyber expertise to achieve strategic ob-
jectives and challenge perceived adversaries in cyberspace. 4 Le-
gitimate companies supply a lucrative black market by develop-
ing and selling professional-quality invasion technologies, which
makes for a well-equipped foreign and domestic threat cam-
paign."
These tech savvy criminals are further undeterred from partic-
ipation because of the low cost of entry, perceived payoff, and lack
of actual consequences. The result is that the greatest threats of
today no longer take on a militant form, and the modern muni-
tions are the widely available free encryption technology, mobile-
messaging applications, the dark web and virtual environments
that bring to fruition criminal operations." Furthermore, the
scale and sophistication of the cybercriminal enterprise has be-
come supreme, as criminals surreptitiously control armies of in-
fected computers, known as botnets, to wage attacks and "conceal
their identities and locations while perpetrating crimes ranging
from drug dealing to online child sexual exploitation."
12. JAMES R. CLAPPER, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: WORLDWIDE THREAT
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 3-4 (2016), https://www.armed-ser
vices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf.
13. See Diana S. Dolliver, How a Virtual 'Mob Boss'from Texas Became The New Face
of Organized Crime, THE CONVERSATION (July13, 2015, 6:21 AM), https://theconversati
on.comlhow-a-virtual-mob-boss-from-texas-became-the-new-face-of-organized-crime-43685;
see also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
14. See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. NO. 114-8, at 7-8.
15. CLAPPER, supra note 12, at 3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 6.
18. Cyber Crime: Modernizing Our Legal Framework for the Information Age: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism, 114th Cong. 9
(2015) (statement of David M. Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Crim. Division), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=790581.
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News of "hackers" and "hactivists" are now commonplace in the
media." Cyberattacks are responsible for disabling 1500 comput-
ers in the Pentagon,2 0 claiming the private information of 83 mil-
lion JP Morgan clients,2 1 compromising the United States' electric
grid,22 manipulating the stock market,22 penetrating the voter reg-
istry, and holding hospital systems for ransom.
The catalyst for the Rule 41 amendments is not the prominence
of this cybercrime per se, but rather the second dilemma agents
face-finding and investigating this branch of criminals. The FBI
calls this problem "Going Dark."26 Our modern criminal has "gone
to school" to learn how to use encrypted security platforms built
for gaming or other commercial purposes to evade detection and
facilitate terrorism.27 Specifically, the Going Dark problem has
created a gap between agents' authority and the inherent ability
to gather valuable evidence in cases ranging from organized
19. See Tom Sorell, Human Rights and Hactivism: The Cases of Wikileaks and Anon-
ymous, 7 J. HUM. RIGHTS PRAC. 391, 391-92 (2015), http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/
7/3/391.full.pdf+html. "Hacktivists" engage in "hactivism:" "a form of political activism in
which computer hacking skills are heavily employed against powerful commercial institu-
tions and governments" to steal corporate secrets and reveal classified government infor-
mation. Id.
20. Whacking Hackers, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 9, 2007, 11:18 AM), http://www.newsweek.
com/whacking-hackers-103531.
21. Pete Brush, Israeli Suspects in Giant JPMorgan Hack Deny Charges in NY, LAW
360 (June 9, 2016, 7:03 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/805660/israeli-suspects-in-
giant-jpmorgan-hack-deny-charges-in-ny.
22. Eric Beech, Cyberspies Penetrate Electric Grid: Report, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2009,
9:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyberattack-usa-idUSTRE53729120090408.
23. Max Fisher, Syrian Hackers Claim AP Hack That Tipped Stock Market by $136
Billion. Is it Terrorism?, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-hack-that-tipped-stock-market-
by-136-billion-is-it-terrorism/.
24. Ellen Nakashima, Russian Hackers Targeted Arizona Election System, WASH.
POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-is-inves
tigating-foreign-hacks-of-state-election-systems/2016/08/29/6e758ff4-6e00-11e6-8365-bl9e
428a975e-story.
25. Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 In Bitcoin To Hackers; FBI In-
vestigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/tech
nology/la-me-In-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-20160217-story.html.
26. See generally Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Valerie Caproni, Gen-
eral Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Going Dark: Lawful Electronic
Surveillance].
27. Margaret Coker et al., How Islamic State Teaches Tech Savvy to Evade Detection,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2015, 9:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-teaches-
tech-savvy-1447720824.
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crime and drug trafficking to terrorism and espionage.28 Moreo-
ver, cybercrime transcends borders and has no territorial jurisdic-
tion, whereas law enforcement and the judiciary must still play
by the rules of the physical world.2 ' Legislators, judges, United
States attorneys, and the public must choose whether to prioritize
privacy or security.
Through agency rulemaking," the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules for the Judicial Conference of the United States
made the decision to ease the burden on federal investigators and
expand the jurisdictional scope of "remote access" search war-
rants for electronic devices.32 With limited exceptions, prior to the
amendments, judges generally could issue a warrant for a search
only in their district." However, with the jurisdictional limita-
tions removed for remotely seeking electronically stored infor-
mation, Rule 41 now provides few parameters for "remote access"
searches. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment requirements
are the last vestige for privacy protection before crossing the line
into unmitigated general search warrants by law enforcement. In
order to circumscribe electronic search warrants and apply the
28. See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance, supra note 26, at 10; see also
Stephanie K. Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology Fix-Doctrine to
Follow, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 489, 522-25 (2013) (arguing that advancements in technolo-
gy serve as a regulator alongside the courts and Congress to limit the Government's gaze,
but the privacy-security-enhancing benefits of technology also prevent law enforcement
from accessing communications content).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012) (circumscribing magistrates judicial authority); H.
MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 84-85 (Office of Legal Educ., Execu-
tive Office for U.S. Attorneys ed., 3d ed. 2009) ("Agents should obtain multiple warrants if
they have reason to believe that a network search will retrieve data stored in multiple lo-
cations.").
30. Deciphering the Debate Over Encryption: Industry and Law Enforcement Perspec-
tives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 2-3 (2016) (statement of Amy Hess, Executive Assis-
tant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Science and Technology Branch).
31. See generally Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2012) (granting Article
III courts general rulemaking authority).
32. Contra Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (2004) (arguing that the
legislative branch rather than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules
when technology is changing).
33. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (2)-(5) (authorizing out-of-district or extra-territorial
warrants in cases where: (1) property in the district where the warrant is issued might be
moved outside the district before the warrant is executed; (2) tracking devices, which may
be monitored outside the district if installed within the district; (3) investigations of do-
mestic or international terrorism; and (4) property located in a United States territory or a
United States diplomatic or consular mission).
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Fourth Amendment to a search of multiple unknown computers,
it is important to fully understand which technology is involved
and how a remote search is executed. Otherwise the private af-
fairs of the innocent general populous could be inadvertently ex-
posed to government agents. Given that warrants take place ex
parte and rarely involve judicial opinions, this comment is in-
tended to anticipate future case law by providing a "particular"
framework and analysis for applying constitutional requirements
to applications for, and challenges to, warrants under the new
Rule 41(b)(6).
B. "Concealed Through Technological Means"-Anonymity,
Encryption, and the Dark Web
The lexicon in this area can be foreign, but understanding the
ways in which individuals remain anonymous and untraceable on
the Internet is imperative. First, a new extraterritorial provision
in Rule 41 is triggered if media or information "has been con-
cealed through technological means."34 Second, understanding the
technology and its myriad of uses is important because this ulti-
mately should play a role in determining whether a user of anon-
ymization technology has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Because of the way the Internet operates, internet service pro-
viders ("ISPs"), and in turn law enforcement, know our names,
addresses, search histories, and internet protocol ("IP") address-
which identifies the specific computer using the Internet." With
this much information exposed simply by logging onto the Inter-
net, many people wish to surf the Web and exchange communica-
tions or sensitive information free from state or corporate surveil-
lance." Those who conceal their identity while online through
anonymization technology are not just predators lurking in the
corners of the Web, but also voters, whistle-blowers, authors of
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A). For example, this would allow a judge in New York to
issue a warrant for the search of a computer in California, executed by agents sitting at
their desk in New York.
35. E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400 (2012); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing a lineage of Fourth Amendment privacy cases); see Part V in-
fra.
36. See Eric Jardine, The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity and Online Policing, in
GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2 (2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sit
es/default/files/no.21.pdf.
37. Id.
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controversial publications, journalists, investigators, and other
government agents." As noted, these benefits come with the
drawback of creating a Dark Net-where most have never been-
a place for illegal drugs, weapons, and child abuse imagery-
where those engaged can deal without the risk of facing law en-
forcement or public scrutiny." There are several readily available
privacy enhancing technologies including proxy servers, virtual
private networks ("VPNs"), encryption and anonymizing browsers
like Tor." Using any one of these on an electronic device would
satisfy being "concealed through technological means."4 1
1. Proxy Servers
Widely utilized by governmental agencies, private companies
and schools, a proxy server is simply a computer service that acts
as an intermediary between senders and receivers of infor-
mation.4 2 If used correctly, the website you are visiting, and thus
your ISP, will only be able to "see" the identifying information of
* * 43the proxy service you are using.
2. Virtual Private Networks
A VPN is a collection of devices that have the ability to both
send and receive data among themselves." Sensitive information
can be passed among those within the network with an even
38. Emin Caliskan et al., Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Net-
work, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE 24 (2015), https://ccdcoe.
org/sites/default/files/multimedialpdf/TOR AnonymityNetwork.pdf (illustrating that this
also includes victims of abuse, witnesses to serious crimes, and intelligence officers).
39. See Jardine, supra note 36, at 2-4.
40. Ruogu Kang, Stephanie Brown, & Sara Kiesler, Why Do People Seek Anonymity on
the Internet? Informing Policy and Design, SIGCHI CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYS. 2657, 2661-62 (2013), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/SaraKiesler
2/publication/262273589 Whydopeople-seek-anonymity-on theInternetInforming-pol
icy-and design/links/561fb32b08aea35f267df808.pdf.
41. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A).
42. Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 4.
43. See Foshoto Stephen Gbenga et al., Development of An Identity Management Sys-
tem For a Web Proxy Server In a Tertiary Institution Using Anonymity Technology, 11
INT'L J. PHYS. Scl. 157, 158 (2016), http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/IJPS/article-
full-text-pdf/850997559614; Brad Chacos, How (and Why) to Surf the Web in Secret,
PCWORLD (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:30 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2013534/how-and-why-
to-surf-the-web-in-secret.html.
44. Paul Ferguson & Geoff Huston, What Is a VPN?, 1 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2, 2
(1998), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en-us/aboutlacl23/acl47/archived-issues/ipj_1-1/ipj_-
1.pdf.
734 [Vol. 51:727
AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL RULE 41
greater degree of impunity because the information is also en-
crypted as it passes between each host of the subnetwork.4 5 Hack-
ers attempting to pry would only see the encrypted data.4 6
3. Tor, "The Onion Router"
The Dark Web, a term loosely used, is that part of the Internet
accessible only through the onion router ("Tor").4 As designed,
circumventing Tor's obscuring capabilities requires significant
time and advanced technical abilities,8 which made the Tor ser-
vice browser the bane of federal law enforcement until 2012.49
There are other similar service browsers. However, with an av-
erage of two million users per day in 2015, Tor is the predominate
choice when seeking anonymity because the platform prevents
covert observers from identifying which sites users are visiting,
as well as the sites from identifying the visitor."o Tor's infrastruc-
ture is comprised of thousands of volunteer "relays" or "nodes"
around the globe that traffic the information along a pathway."
Each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no other
nodes in the path.52 The information is heavily encrypted end to
end along this broken path," but is then unwrapped at each node
(like the layers of an onion) and relayed downstream."' With re-
gard to how much impunity Tor offers, tech scholars have analo-
gized the Tor network to the postal service: one cannot see what
45. Id. at 9.
46. Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 5.
47. Tor is the brainchild of the United States Naval Research Laboratory ("NRL"),
which made its debut in 1996 when three researches at NRL presented the project. See
generally David M. Goldschlag, Michael G. Reed, & Paul F. Syverson, Hidden Routing In-
formation, WORKSHOP ON INFO. HIDING (May 1996), https://www.onion-router.net/Publica
tions/IH-1996.pdf.
48. Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 13.
49. Kevin Poulsen, The FBI Used the Web's Favorite Hacking Tool to Unmask Tor Us-
ers, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/fbi-metasploit-tor/.
The fact that Tor is free further incentivizes users. See What Is Tor?, TOR PROJECT:
ANONYMITY ONLINE, https://www.torproject.org/.
50. Gareth Owen & Nick Savage, The Tor Dark Net, GLOBAL COMM'N ON INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 1 (Sept. 2015), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no20O0.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Roger Dingledine et al., Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router, 13th USENIX
SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 1 (2004), http://www.nrl.navy.millitd/chacs/sites/www.nrl.navy.mil.
itd.chacs/files/pdfs/Dingledine%20etal2004.pdf.
53. Jardine, supra note 36, at 2.
54. Dingledine et al., supra note 52, at 1 (explaining what has come to be known as
"onion routing"); see also Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 6-7.
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happens in the sorting room, but can see how many letters every
address posts and receives each day. Thus, encrypted data can
only be observed leaving one person and arriving at the other and
* 55
vice versa.
Tor not only allows users to view content anonymously online,
but individuals can also host anonymous content-a "dark" web-
site-whereby the site itself moves around the Tor network in
much the same way as described above." With these hidden ser-
vices individuals can feature political blogs and forums, or pro-
vide a marketplace for weapons and illegal drugs, or the distribu-
tion of child pornography. However, Tor users are not
automatically placed among questionable company. Should a Tor
user wish to simply surf the Web anonymously without wading
into the murky areas of the Internet, Tor may be used like Google
Chrome or Mozilla Firefox to privately engage in routine activi-
ties."'
II. THE PREREQUISITES TO "HACKING," ITS FORMS AND RELATED
TERMINOLOGY
"All warfare is based on deception.... Hold out baits to entice the
enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.""
Rarely does bank robbery today take place in person, and
agents no longer need to break down a door to obtain evidence.
Both are now effectuated via cyber expertise: computer hacking.
A "hacker" is anyone "who surreptitiously uses or changes the in-
formation in another's computer system."" Hackers and law en-
forcement share a common challenge they must first overcome:
entry. Gaining access to another's computer, requires "malware"
or "malicious technology," which often comes in the form of soft-
ware that is covertly deployed and can then be used to monitor or
55. Owen & Savage, supra note 50, at 7.
56. Jardine, supra note 36, at 2; Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 11 (explaining that
these sites have non-traditional URLs; the website addresses within Tor are algorithm
generated characters followed by the suffix ".onion."); Dingledine et al., supra note 52, at
8.
57. Owen & Savage, supra note 50, at 1. Large portions of this hidden part of the In-
ternet is off Google's radar and creates a Dark Net for illicit activity. See Jardine, supra
note 36, at 2.
58. Jardine, supra note 36, at 2.
59. TZU, supra note 1, at 26-27.
60. Hacker, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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gain control of another's computer system." However, before the
intruder can execute this malware, it must be delivered to the
computer system." This is accomplished by exploiting vulnerabili-
ties: either a human weakness or a technical vulnerability in the
target's system." Hackers exploit a vulnerability and gain access
to a computer in one of two primary methods: by employing social
engineering or a "watering-hole" tactic. The means employed by
those hackers in the news media, and the way in which agents
have, and will, "remotely access" target computers pursuant to
search warrants-are one and the same.
A. Social Engineering: A Little Impersonation and Deception
Social engineering exploits the flaws in human logic and our
natural tendency to trust others or perform requested actions.6 4
With this method, an intruder gains access to a target computer
by first sending a repetitious pop-up ad or e-mail that masquer-
ades as though it came from a legitimate and well-known busi-
ness." The ad or e-mail, unbeknownst to the target, is laced with
malicious computer code that will be covertly deployed onto the
target's computer merely by clicking on the ad or e-mail contain-
ing the intriguing subject line." In computer parlance, this is the
cyberworld's version of the "Trojan Horse.""
61. Malicious Technology, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Zango,
Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F. 3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing "malware"
and "malicious technology" and its effects).
62. Thomas Rid & Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, 38 J. STRATEGIC STUD.
4, 15 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.977382.
63. Id. at 15-16; see also Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, & Susan Lan-
dau, Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 25-26 (2014) (detailing the panoply of ways to gain entry,
including infected attachments in e-mail, malware on web pages, poor implementations of
network protocols, and users downloading and voluntarily executing programs, believing
that the program serves a desirable and credible purpose).
64. Xin (Robert) Luo et al., Social Engineering: The Neglected Human Factor for In-
formation Security Management, 24 INFO. RESOURCES MGMT. J. 1, 3 (2011), http://www.
unm.edul-xinluopapers/IRMJ2011.pdf; see also SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT
REPORT 27-29 (Vol. 2016) [hereinafter INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT], https://www.
symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf (collecting examples
of SE attacks).
65. Luo et al., supra note 64, at 4.
66. See id. at 3-4; Rid & Buchanan, supra note 62, at 16.
67. The term gets its name from the Greek story of the Trojan War, where the Greeks
offered the Trojans a peace offering in the form of a large wooden horse. See Trojan Horse,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 2002). However, Greek soldiers lay hidden inside,
and once the Trojans wheeled the horse behind the gates and night fell, the Greek soldiers
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1. The FBI Employs Social Engineering Tactics to
Surreptitiously Gain Access
Pursuant to search warrants, federal agents have been deploy-
ing malware and spyware to conduct computer searches for near-
ly fifteen years, albeit in the primitive form of a keystroke log-
ger." By 2001, the FBI adapted their hacking capabilities and
rebranded their malware as a Computer and Internet Protocol
Address Verifier ("CIPAV"), which came to be known as the FBI's
"Magic Lantern" for effectively searching unknown target com-
puters." For example, the FBI used social engineering via a ficti-
tious e-mail from the Associated Press to identify the IP address
of a terrorist sending bomb threats to administrators at Timber-
line High School in Lacey, Washington."
Agents' covert method of deploying spyware was later cryptical-
ly renamed in its warrant applications as a request to deploy a
Network Investigative Technique ("NIT"), an acronym still used
today.7 Such a warrant was approved to locate an anonymous
culprit, identified only by the e-mail address texan.slayer@yahoo.
com, who sent messages to county police in Colorado, pledging to
hidden inside the horse climbed out and let their confederates in to ravage the city of Troy.
Id.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001); see also
Kevin Poulsen, FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats, WIRED
(July 18, 2007), http://archive.wired.com/politics/1aw/news/2007/07/fbi-spyware?current
Page=all (recounting the FBI's 1999 investigation of mobster Nicodemo Scarfo).
69. See Ted Bridis, FBI Is Building a 'Magic Lantern, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2001),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/23/fbi-is-building-a-magic-lanter
n/ca972123-83a8-46d8-b95c-c2edafda0feal; Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide
Details on Government's Surveillance Spyware, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.:
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbi-documen
ts-show-depth-government#footnote2_ab30fhg (providing links to documents).
70. See Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, In re Matter of the Search of
Any Computer Accessing Electronic Message(s) Directed to Administrator(s) of MySpace
Account "Timberlinebombinfo" and Opening Messages Delivered to That Account by the
Government at 2, No. MJO7-5114, at 5-13 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2007), http://www.
politechbot.com/docs/fbi.cipav.sanders.affidavit.071607.pdf- see also Ellen Nakashima &
Paul Farhi, FBI Lured Suspect with Fake Web Page, But May Have Leveraged Media Cred-
ibility, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-sec
urity/fbi-lured-suspect-with-fake-web-page-but-may-have-leveraged-media-credibility/2014
/10/28/e6a9ac94-5edO-11e4-91f7-5d89b5e8c251-story.html. The teen in that case plead
guilty and never challenged the warrant. See United States v. MySpace Account 'Timber-
linebombinfo," No. 3:07-mj-05114 (W.D. Wash. Jun 12, 2007).
71. Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In re Matter of the Search of
Network Investigative Technique ("NIT") for E-mail Address texan.slayer@yahoo.com, No.
1:12-sw-05685-KMT, at 1 (D. Col. Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter "NIT" Warrant for texan.slay
er@yahoo.com], https://cryptome.org/2013/12/nit-email-search.pdf.
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set off Ammonium Nitrate explosions if demands were not met.
In that case, agents used an e-mail tainted with malware to lo-
cate the unidentified source of the threats." The warrant did not
use the words "hack," "malware" or "spyware," but instead stated
that "communications" would be sent "to cause an activating
computer to send certain information to a computer controlled by
the . . . FBI."74 Although passively phrased, this is surreptitious
entry via social engineering.
Absent prior familiarity, these warrants appear to request in-
formation that will simply be gleaned from the ether." However,
with an understanding of well-established methods of social engi-
neering, and a cursory review of the pages of these warrant appli-
cations, one can see NIT means: surreptitiously installing soft-
ware on a target's computer.
B. Watering Hole Attacks or Drive-By-Downloads: Optimal for
Searching the Masses
A "watering hole" or "drive-by-download" tactic represents an
insidious form of malware delivery in the black hat arsenal,
whereby the mere connection to a website can result in the instal-
lation of malware on the user's computer. The malicious website
silently passes malicious code to the victim, which then forces the
browser to download, store, and silently execute a malicious ap-
plication." This method of delivery involves a remote injection of
72. See id. at 4-15; see also Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI's Search for 'Mo,'
Suspect In Bomb Threats, Highlights Use of Malware For Surveillance, WASH. POST (Dec.
6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352bal74-5397-
11e3-9e2c-edOl 116fd98_story.html?utmterm+.7dfbl4dff7c2.
73. See "NIT" Warrant for texan.slayer@yahoo.com, supra note 71, at 1, 5.
74. Id. at 5, 16; see also Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 72 (resulting NIT search
returned an IP address from Tehran, Iran). For another example of an NIT warrant used
to apprehend an evasive suspect in a bank fraud and identity theft scheme, see Affidavit of
Justin E. Noble in Support of Application for Search Warrant, In re Search of Network
Investigative Technique ("NIT") for E-mail Address 512socialeedia@gmail.com, No. 12-mj-
748-ML, at 5, 12 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter "NIT" Warrant for E-mail Address
512socialmedia@gmail.com], http://ia800205.us.archive.org/23/items/gov.uscourts.txwd.59
7669/gov.uscourts.txwd.597669.1.1.pdf.
75. See, e.g., "NIT" Warrant for E-mail Address 512socialmedia@gmail.com, supra
note 74, at 12; see also Brian L. Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing Trojan
Horses, 48 AKRON L. REV. 315, 324-337 (2015) (discussing in detail the facts of the social
engineering cases mentioned in this comment).
76. Long Lu et al., BLADE: An Attack-Agnostic Approach for Preventing Drive-By
Malware Infections, 17TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER COMM. SECURITY 440, 440 (2010),
http://dl.acm.org/ft-gateway.cfm?id=1866356&ftid=849819&dwn=1&CFID=850839721&C
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malicious code into a website, which will then search a target
computer when passed onto visiting internet users.7 ' For obvious
reasons hackers opt for this method of delivery because it pro-
vides a larger platform for delivery, and in turn, a greater num-
ber of computers will be accessed by the intruder."
1. Instances of Federal Agents Taking Advantage of "Watering
Hole" Tactics
At first glance, it is difficult to tell whether agents will use so-
cial engineering or a watering hole method in an NIT warrant
application because they both use the term NIT to denote how the
search will be executed." The giveaway is in the title of the war-
rant: one is for a specific e-mail account"o and the other is for all
computers accessing a website."' Deciphering how a watering hole
"search" will be executed is further complicated by the fact that
the description of the NIT in a warrant application is couched in
the pacifying terms that the website will be augmented "with
some additional computer instructions ... designed to cause the
'activating' computer to deliver certain information to . . . the
government."8 2 This evasive terminology simply means code is
surreptitiously pushed onto all visitors of a website, which then
FTOKEN=25126908; see also Marco Cova et al., Detection and Analysis of Drive-by-
Download Attacks and Malicious JavaScript Code, 19TH INT'L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB
281, 281 (2010), https://cs.UCSb.edul-virginialpublications.2010_covaKniegel-vigna-wep
awet.pdf.
77. See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 62, at 16 (clarifying that no user action is re-
quired and no symptoms of the infection may ever manifest); Lu et al., supra note 76, at
441.
78. See INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, supra note 64, at 38.
79. Compare Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computers that Access
the Website "Bulletin Board A", No. 8:12-MJ-356, at 31 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Warrant for Computers that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A"], https://www.doc
umentcloud.org/documents/1261620torpedo-affidavit.html (utilizing watering hole de-
ployment), with "NIT" Warrant for texan.slayer@yahoo.com, supra note 71, at 20 (utilizing
socially engineered e-mail).
80. See, e.g., "NIT" Warrant for texan.slayer@yahoo.com, supra note 71, at 1.
81. See, e.g., Warrant for Computers that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A," su-
pra note 79, at 1.
82. Id. at 30. Cryptic explanations of technology are not unusual for federal agents.
See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less
Than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the
Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 161-63
(2013) (discussing the government's lack of candor to judges when seeking authority to use
"StingRay" cell phone tracking devices, and quoting Judge Owlsey stating, "I may have
seen them before and not realized what it was, because what they do is present an appli-
cation that looks essentially like a pen register application").
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commands the users' computers to send information to federal
agents."
By way of illustration, pursuant to an NIT warrant in Opera-
tion Torpedo, agents apprehended a child pornography enterprise
operated through a hidden website on the Tor browser." The war-
rant authorized inserting code onto an illicit website that would
then result in the search of any computer "wherever located," that
accessed the images section of the website or viewed a private
message." With the information obtained from the search, agents
were able to prosecute over a dozen visitors to the site."
The largest watering hole search campaign in federal law en-
forcement history, occurred recently and is discussed in depth in
Part IV. While there are other suspected examples of agents turn-
ing websites into watering holes in order to apprehend those hid-
ing behind Tor," motions to unseal those warrants are pending."
C. The Final Component in a Successful Hacking Campaign: A
Zero-Day Vulnerability
Zero-day vulnerabilities are pivotal to gaining entry into any
electronic device. A zero-day vulnerability is an "unknown flaw in
a computer program that exposes the program to external ma-
nipulation," and can be exploited from the "zero-th" day of discov-
83. Compare Lu et al., supra note 76, at 441 ("[AI1 drive-by exploits begin with a re-
mote code injection . . . within the browser .... [T]he shellcode effectively coerces the now
tainted browser into fetching a remote malware application ... and executing it on the
victim's host.), with Warrant for Computers that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A,"
supra note 79, at 30, 32.
84. See Warrant for Computers that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A," supra
note 79, at 32, 34; Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website, and the FBI Could End Up in
Your Computer, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/operation
-torpedo/ (detailing the facts of Operation Torpedo).
85. Warrant for Computers that Access the Website "Bulletin Board A," supra note
79, at 31-32, 35. The information obtained included the IP address, unique session identi-
fier, and the type of operating system running on the computer. Id. at 35.
86. Poulsen, supra note 84. Litigation from defendants contesting the warrant was
limited but ultimately unsuccessful. See United States v. Pierce, No. 8:13CR106, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 147114, at *18 (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2014) (denying a collection of suppression
motions from multiple defendants).
87. See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Mal-
ware Attack, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-
hosting-fbi.
88. See Motion to Unseal Court Docket Sheet, In re Sealed Docket Sheet Associated
with Malware Warrant Issued on July 22, 2013, No. 1:16-CV-03029 (D. Md. Aug. 29,
2016).
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ering the vulnerability." A zero-day vulnerability is simply
knowledge that there is a flaw in an operating system, and the
zero-day exploit is then the malware code designed to take ad-
vantage of that vulnerability.90 The code will be attached to an e-
mail or embedded in the website, passed onto the target, and al-
low the intruder to gain control over the target's computer sys-
tem."
Because the essential vulnerabilities are discovered and not
made, there is a black market for both the knowledge of the vul-
nerability, and the code that has already been designed to exploit
the known vulnerability.9 2 In order to carry out NIT searches, the
government is a participant in the black market for zero-day vul-
nerabilities.93 This involvement raises the concern of whether the
government should be reporting knowledge of these vulnerabili-
ties to software developers, like Microsoft, or keeping them in re-
serve to execute the next cyber-warrant in an NIT. With the ju-
risdictional limitations lifted on granting NIT warrants under
Rule 41, agents will likely seek to use such warrants more often,
and therefore the government will have an increased need for ze-
ro-day vulnerabilities.
D. Botnets, and "Damaged" Within the Meaning of Rule
41 (b) (6) (B)
The second added extraterritorial provision in Rule 41 is trig-
gered if the investigation involves computer crimes" "where the
89. Mailyn Fidler, Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade: A Preliminary Analy-
sis, 11 J.L. & POL'Y FOR THE INFO. SOC'y 405, 408 (2015). There is no perfect system, and
zero-day vulnerabilities exist in Microsoft, Internet Explorer, Adobe, Apple products, and
even our most secure digital infrastructure. Id.; INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, su-
pra note 64, at 39 (reporting that on average a new zero-day vulnerability was discovered
every week in 2015).
90. Fidler, supra note 89, at 408-09.
91. See Ben Buchanan, The Life Cycles of Cyber Threats, 58 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL'Y
& STRATEGY 39, 40, 42 (2016), https://www.iiss.org/-/media//silos/survival/2016/survival/58-
1-03-buchanan/58-1-03-buchanan.pdf (outlining that discovery and development of the ex-
ploit occur before introduction).
92. See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63, at 42; Fidler, supra note 89,
at 410; INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, supra note 64, at 38.
93. See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, & Landau, supra note 63, at 41-42, 47; Fidler, supra
note 89, at 411-12. Both articles focus heavily on zero-day exploits and the government's
involvement in the market, as well as provide well-articulated policy concerns. Although
Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, and Landau focus on the vulnerabilities used to execute wiretaps,
the same principles and concerns apply in the computer context.
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012) (indicating that it is a criminal violation to know-
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media are protected computers that have been damaged.""
"Damaged," as used in Rule 41, means any impairment to the in-
tegrity of a program or system." If a computer user has been the
victim of a social engineering or watering hole attack, or unsus-
pectingly caught in a botnet, the user's computer would fall with-
in the definition of "damaged" and thus be exposed to the extra-
territorial search operations of federal agents."
A botnet, referenced in the Rule 41 advisory committee notes,"
is a group of computers that have been infected with malicious
software, whereby millions of computers become part of a "zombie
army" subject to the control of the "botmaster."" When this occurs
computer owners are unaware, unable to resist, and can be made
to perform automated tasks over the Internet without knowing
it."' Unwittingly, users may be helping criminals.'0 ' The reality of
the JoT is that it allows criminals to create unprecedented armies
of botnets, which can be used or sold for a relatively inexpensive
price.' 0 ' Relatedly and even more unsettling, is that a large por-
tion of the population is susceptible to a search for unwitting in-
volvement in a botnet under the new Rule 41(b)(6)(B).
ingly transmit a program or code and access a protected computer without authorization).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) advisory committee's
note to 2016 amendments (giving "damage" the meaning provided in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(8)).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8); see also supra Part II.A-B (discussing the mechanics of
social engineering and watering hole attacks). This is concerning because 8 percent of
global botnet activity originates in the United States, and malware is linked to 1 in 3172
websites, as well as 1 in 220 e-mails. See INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, supra note
64, at 8-9, 60.
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B) advisory committee's notes to 2016 amendments.
99. Kalpna Midha et al., An Introduction to Botnet Attacks and It's Solutions, 1 INT'L
J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS & INFO. TECH. 37, 37 (2012), http://www.ijcait.com/IJ
CAIT/128R.pdf; Botnets 101: What They Are and How to Avoid Them, FBI: UCR (June 5,
2013), https://ucr.fbi.gov/news/newsblog/botnets-10 1/botnets- 101-what-they-are-and-how-
to-avoid-them (noting that infected computers in a botnet can number in the millions).
100. Midha et al., supra note 99, at 37; David J. Malan, Rapid Detection of Botnets
through Collaborative Networks of Peers 1 (June 7, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2961233.
101. Midha et al., supra note 99, at 37. Typically, the botmaster uses his drone army to
facilitate a distributed denial of service attack ("DdoS"), in which the drone army initiates
a flood of data requests directed at the target system, which shuts down due to the over-
whelming amount of requests. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counter-
striking- Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 443-45
(2012) (noting that DDoS attacks can be used against hospitals and defense systems).
102. INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT, supra note 64, at 8-9, 57, 60, 66 (noting the
size and scope of attacks and the readily available opportunity to order a DDoS for $10 to
$1000 per day).
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III. THE PROPOSAL AND THE PROCESS TO AMEND FEDERAL
RULE 41
"[Tihe soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he
is facing . .. so in warfare there are no constant conditions.""'
In early 2013, agents in Texas requested a warrant to remotely
install data extraction software on a target computer-location
and suspect unknown.' Once installed, the software had the ca-
pacity to search the computer's hard drive, activate the comput-
er's built-in camera, generate latitude and longitude coordinates
for the computer's location, and transmit the extracted data to
FBI agents."' The court was unaware of a reported case which
discussed the government's proposed technique within the con-
text of a Rule 41 search, and expressed concern that the applica-
tion contained little to no explanation of how the target computer
would be found."' The court rejected the government's request."o7
Still the court remarked, "there may well be a good reason to up-
date the territorial limits of [Rule 41] in light of advancing com-
puter search technology."'0 Because of this decision, and others
like it, five months later the Department of Justice set the gears
in motion to change Rule 41.09
A. The Proposal to Amend Rule 41
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") presented to the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules a proposal to remove the obstruc-
tion impairing the ability of law enforcement to investigate multi-
103. TZU, supra note 1, at 46.
104. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp.
2d 753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 758-59 n.10. The court also expressed concerns about collateral damage. Id.
at 759.
107. Id. at 758-61 (holding that the warrant application failed to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement and standards for video surveillance, and also
violated Rule 41 jurisdictional limitations).
108. Id. at 761.
109. Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Hon. Reena
Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules (Sept. 18, 2013), in Advisory Comm.
on Criminal Rules, Materials for April 7-8, 2014 [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Materials
for April 7-8], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites'default/files/fr-import/CR2013-10.pdf (citing
In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753
(S.D. Tex. 2013), and the court's recommendation to update the territorial limits of Rule
41).
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district internet crimes. The proposed Rule 41 change specifically
addressed limitations faced by law enforcement in two situations:
"(1) where the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be
searched but the district within which a computer is located is
unknown, and (2) where the investigation requires law enforce-
ment to coordinate searches of numerous computers in numerous
districts.""o The DOJ avowed that updating Rule 41 in this regard
would allow law enforcement to prosecute the increasing number
of criminals who use anonymization technologies, as well as pur-
sue the sophisticated botnet attacks launched from multiple com-
puters in multiple districts."' The DOJ supported the proposal
with three sample warrants to show how agents might apply for
authorization to execute an NIT search warrant.11 2 As discussions
progressed the advisory committee made clear that "the proposed
amendment's language speaks directly only to venue, and ... the
government must satisfy constitutional requirements with re-
spect to any warrant."
At the subcommittee phase, an enthusiastic debate began with
concerns that Rule 41 should address the first of the DOJ's chal-
lenges, but should not allow multiple searches in multiple dis-
tricts." Specifically, some were concerned that in the context of
searching digitally stored information, the proposed change
would obviate the prevailing practice of knock, seize, and search
offsite, as well as incentivize agents to circumvent the practice of
110. See Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 171. The amend-
ments also allow delayed notice of the search, however, this was already a part of Rule 41,
and seeking delayed notice in these circumstances is not a departure from the norm. See
18 U.S.C. 1302 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3). For this reason, this comment does not
focus on this aspect of the amendments.
111. See Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 172-73 (contend-
ing that seeking ninety-four warrants in ninety-four districts is impractical).
112. Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Pol'y and Leg. to
Judge John F. Keenan, Chair, Subcomm. on Rule 41 (Jan. 17, 2014), in Advisory Comm.
Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 179-235 (providing examples of a warrant for
an investigation of a series of bomb threats, a warrant for a child pornography website op-
erating as a "hidden service" on the Tor network, and a warrant that would be sought in a
botnet investigation).
113. Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 155.
114. Compare Memorandum from Orin Kerr to Members of the Rule 41 Subcomm.
(Feb. 3, 2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 239-41 (rais-
ing concerns over forum shopping, and the criticism that a search of multiple locations not
owned by the same person violates the particularity requirement), with Memorandum
from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Pol'y and Legis. to Judge John F. Keenan,
Chair, Subcomm. on Rule 41 (Feb. 7, 2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-
8, supra note 109, at 246-47 (addressing concerns raised by Professor Orin Kerr).
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working with ISPs before obtaining evidence."' After airing these
issues, the subcommittee made stylistic changes and in early
March 2014 concluded that there were compelling justifications to
advance the proposal and seek public comment."' The advisory
committee then met in early April 2014 and recommended the
Rule 41 proposal for public comment,"' and stated in the report
that "the use of anonymizing software to mask the location of a
computer should not prevent the issuance of a warrant.""' In Au-
gust 2014, the public comment period was opened for the pro-
posed Rule 41 amendments."'
B. Notice and Comment Period-Opponents and Supporters
Leading technology companies like Google, as well as, promi-
nent civil rights groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, presented a gamut of concerns and made a compelling case
against the Rule 41 changes.' 2 ' Opponents portrayed the proposal
115. See Memorandum from Orin Kerr to Members of the Rule 41 Subcomm. (Feb. 8,
2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8, supra note 109, at 251-52 (citing Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012)). But see Memoran-
dum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Pol'y and Leg. to Judge John F. Keenan,
Chair, Subcomm. on Rule 41 (March 5, 2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-8,
supra note 109, at 262-63 (addressing the particularity requirement for remote access
searches on a "tracking device" rationale, and alternatively that jurisprudence permits a
search of more than one piece of property).
116. Memorandum from Sara Beale and Nancy King, Reporters to Members, Criminal
Rules Advisory Comm. (Mar. 17, 2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for April 7-
8, supra note 109, at 155-61.
117. Draft Minutes of Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules (Apr. 7-8, 2014), in Comm.
on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Materials for May 29-30, 2014 Meeting 532-33 [here-
inafter Advisory Comm. Materials for May 29-30], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default
/files/frjimport/ST2014-05.pdf.
118. Memorandum from the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Criminal
Rules to the Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(May 5, 2014), in Advisory Comm. Materials for May 29-30, supra note 117, at 485-86.
119. See Memorandum from the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Crimi-
nal. Rules to the Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Proc. (May
5, 2014, revised July 2014), in Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed.
Rules of App., Bankr., Civ., and Crim. Proc. 3, 319, 325, 327 [hereinafter Prelim. Draft &
Request for Comment], https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=USC-
RULES-CR-2014-0004-0001&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (labeling "remote
access searches" as sending surveillance software over the internet).
120. See generally Richard Salgado, Google Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Amend-
ment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Salgado, Comment Letter], https://
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0029&
attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (writing in opposition
to the proposed changes to Rule 41); ACLU, Second ACLU Comment Letter on Proposed
Amendment to Rule 41 Concerning "Remote Access" Searches of Electronic Storage Media
(Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Second ACLU Comment Letter], https://www.regulations.
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as a substantive expansion on the government's investigative au-
thority, which raised a number of emphatic constitutional, legal,
and geopolitical concerns.12' A theme among those in opposition
was that such sweeping changes involving individual privacy, as
in the past, ought to be the work of congressional lawmaking.'2 2 In
that same vein, objectors urged that any accommodation for the
administrative burdens on law enforcement should reflect a stat-
utory regime similar to the Wiretap Act,12' and entail a prior de-
termination that the target computer is not used for newsgather-
ing before issuing a remote access warrant.124
Given the global nature of the Internet, and because by defini-
tion the target of the search is unknown, naturally concerns were
also raised that a search outside of the United States could be
implicated, thereby encroaching on foreign relations."' In addi-
tion, commenters requested answers on how Fourth Amendment
requirements could be met for an untold number of unknown
suspects." 6 Still others warned of potential forum shopping for
gov/contentStreamer?documentld=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0013&attachmentNumber
=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (explaining concerns with the proposed
amendments to Rule 41).
121. E.g., Salgado, Comment Letter, supra note 120, at 1.
122. See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (referencing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1804 (2012); Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 2518; Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701; Pen Registers and Trap
and Trace Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3123; and USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1842).
123. See, e.g., Nat'1 Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Comment Letter on Proposed
Amendments to Rule 41 of the Fed. R. Crim. P., at 2-3, 5 (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter
NACDL Comment Letter], https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=US
C-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0038&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&content
Type=pdf (specifically arguing that network searches should be limited to a subset of seri-
ous offenses, rather than permitted in all cases); see also Salgado, Comment Letter, supra
note 120, at 9 (suggesting that as with Title III warrant requirements under the Wiretap
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2518, agents should be required to satisfy mandates, such as exhausting
other investigative techniques).
124. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Comment Letter on the Proposed
Amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 Concerning Remote Access Searches of Electronic Stor-
age Media and Electronic Information, at 1-4 (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov
/contentStreamer?documentld=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0047&attachmentNumber=1
&=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. With limited exceptions, failure to make
such a determination contravenes the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa(a), passed in response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
125. See, e.g., Center for Democracy & Technology, Written Statement Before the Judi-
cial Conference Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, at 3-4 (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004-0009&attachm
entNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (noting that such searches, alt-
hough not within the Fourth Amendment, are typically addressed under the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty process).
126. See, e.g., Second ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 120, at 21-22.
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the most pliant or technologically naive judges, '7 and most re-
peatedly, critics forecasted collateral damage and disapproved of
agents executing remote searches by foisting malware onto nu-
*128
merous systems and compromising computer integrity.
The DOJ countered and was joined by other national councils
and associations who believed the rule changes were necessary.12
The constitutionality of the proposal was defended with remarks
that the purpose of the search is merely to discover the place to be
searched,1 3 0 and assurances were extended that the proposed
changes would merely ensure that some court is available to con-
sider whether a warrant application comports with the Fourth
Amendment."' In conclusion, DOJ representatives denied any ab-
rogation of the Wiretap Act,13 2 averred that Rule 41 remains in
continuity with the Privacy Protection Act,"' and clarified that
the use of remote searches is "not new.
The public comment chapter concluded with a public hearing
on November 5, 2014,"' followed by advisory committee approval
in March 2015,26 and unanimous Standing Committee approval
127. See, e.g., NACDL Comment Letter, supra note 123, at 4-5.
128. See, e.g., id. at 5. See generally Zach Lerner, A Warrant to Hack: An Analysis of the
Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 26 (2016) (outlining primary technology and policy concerns surrounding the
amendments up to the time they were submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court).
129. See, e.g., Robert J. Arello, President, Federal Bar Council, Comment Letter on
Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4 and 41, at 7 (Oct. 27, 2014) (concluding the
courts will answer these questions "in due course").
130. David Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Response to Comments Con-
cerning Proposed Amendment to Rule 41, at 4 (Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Bitkower De-
cember 22 Comment Letter] (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (anal-
ogizing an NIT to installing a beeper in a container, where it is "possible to describe the
object into which the beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led agents to wish to
install the beeper, and the length of time for which beeper surveillance is requested").
131. David Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Additional Response to Com-
ments Concerning Proposed Amendment to Rule 41, at 1 (Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter
Bitkower February 20 Comment Letter].
132. Bitkower December 22 Comment Letter, supra note 130, at 9.
133. Bitkower February 20 Comment Letter, supra note 131, at 1; cf. 42 U.S.C. §
2000aa (2012).
134. Bitkower February 20 Comment Letter, supra note 131, at 2.
135. See generally Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, Pub. Hearing on
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Nov. 5, 2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/file/document/testimony-submitted-november-5-2014-hearing-proposed-
amendments-federal-rules-criminal (providing the written testimonies submitted for the
hearing).
136. Comm. on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the Advisory Comm. on
Criminal Rules, (May 6, 2015), in Final Materials for Congress 23, 24 [hereinafter Final
Materials for Congress], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/2016-04-28-final-package-
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in May 2015.'17 The Judicial Conference of the United States ap-
proved and submitted the amendments to the U.S. Supreme
Court on October 9, 2015.1" The Supreme Court followed suit in
favor of the changes and forwarded the proposal to Congress in
April 2016."' Congress could have rejected the amendments but
failed to garner enough support to do So,140 and Rule 41(b)(6) be-
came authoritative on December 1, 2016. 14 The constitutional
questions are left open, but these issues must be sorted out before
widespread Fourth Amendment violations occur.14
IV. LARGEST KNOWN "REMOTE ACCESS" SEARCH IN FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT HISTORY
"The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the de-
vious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.""'
What started as a "Network Investigative Technique" to identi-
fy suspects involved in a vast online child pornography forum,
later transcended United States' borders and came to be known
as Operation Pacifier, the most extensive hacking investigation in
law enforcement history. Although the suspects apprehended in
this operation do not satisfy a sympathetic profile, it has sparked
congress.
137. Draft Minutes of Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 28, 2015), in
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure Materials for Jan. 7-8, 2016 Meeting 31,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-01-standing-agenda-book.pdf.
138. Memorandum from James C. Duff to the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
(Oct. 9, 2015), in Final Materials for Congress, supra note 136, at 212.
139. See Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to Paul
D. Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2016), in Final Materials for
Congress, supra note 136, at 200.
140. For attempts to do so, see Stop Mass Hacking Act, S. 2952, 114th Cong. (2016),
and its companion bill in the House, H.R. 5321, 114th Cong. (2016). Both explicitly reject-
ed the amendments. See 162 CONG. REC. S. 3032-33 (daily ed. May 19, 2016) (statement of
Sen. Wyden).
141. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012) (providing that upon trans-
mission to Congress, the rule shall take effect December 1 of that year, absent congres-
sional action).
142. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note to 2016 amendments ("The amend-
ment does not address constitutional questions.").
143. TZU, supra note 1, at 47.
144. Stephen Montemayor, Minnesotans Caught in FBI Child Porn Sting, Raising Con-
stitutional Concerns, STARTRIBUNE (Oct. 9, 2016, 7:58 PM), http://www.startribune.com/
minnesotans-caught-in-fbi-child-porn-sting-raising-constitutional-concerns/396472281/; see
also Joseph Cox, Child Porn Sting Goes Global: FBI Hacked Computers in Denmark,
Greece, Chile, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/en-us
/child-porn-sting-goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmarke-greece-chile.
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a constitutional debate on how the FBI seeks out and apprehends
criminals who hide in the obscurity of the Dark Net.1 5 It was ac-
complished with a single website and a single warrant, which
produced criminal defendants all over the country and confound-
ed defense attorneys with a search on a scale they had never seen
before."' What's more, some judges were unfamiliar with the
technology employed by the FBI, which resulted in inconsistent
application of constitutional law, and produced different results
for defendants in different jurisdictions.'4 7
A. "Operation Pacifier-The Investigation and the Warrant
According to the application for the search warrant, in Sep-
tember of 2014 agents began investigating a child pornography
website operated on Tor's Dark Net, which had amassed 158,094
members and was visited weekly by over 11,000 unique users.148
Rather than shut the site down, agents copied the contents of the
website server and installed the website on a government facility
in Newington, Virginia, where the FBI assumed administrative
control and continued to operate it from a government-controlled
server."' Agents proffered that the website was not easily ac-
cessed from a Google search, but rather, access to the site re-
145. Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government Is Catching People Who Use Child
Porn Sites, WASH. POST (Jan 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se
curity/how-the-government-is-using-malware-to-ensnare-child-porn-users/2016/01/21/fb8a
b5f8-becO-11e5-83d4-42e3bceea902_story.html (stating that the FBI's operation "is compa-
rable to flooding a neighborhood with heroin in the hope of sharing an assortment of low-
level drug users").
146. Id.
147. See Joseph Cox, Judge in FBI Hacking Case Is Unclear on How FBI Hacking
Works, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 27, 2016, 12:50 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/judge-
in-fbi-hacking-case-is-unclear-on-how-fbi-hacking-works; see infra Parts V and VI for rec-
ommendations on how to handle these situations.
148. Application for a Search Warrant at 13, 18, In re Search of Computers that Access
upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Operation
Pacifier NIT Warrant], http://ia601205.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.vaed.340813/
gov.uscourts.vaed.340813.27.3.pdf. For coverage of this investigation, see also Mike
Carter, FBI's Massive Porn Sting Puts Internet Privacy in Crossfire, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug.
27, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbis-massive-porn-
sting-puts-internet-privacy-in-crossfire/ (discussing Operation Pacifier, the subject website
known as Playpen, and the litigation).
149. See Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 22-23; see also Joseph
Cox, The FBI's 'Unprecedented' Hacking Campaign Targeted Over a Thousand Computers,
MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbis-unpre
cedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers (reporting that the FBI
ran the website from its own servers from February 20 to March 4, 2015).
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quired the web address obtained from other users, or finding the
site from Internet postings describing the content available."'o
In the warrant application, agents submitted that due to the
anonymity provided by the nature of Tor's network, the IP ad-
dress for the website, as well as the IP addresses of those visiting
the site, could not be determined by a publicly available lookup or
through a subpoena to the ISP. Thus, agents needed to "hack" or,
as it is obliquely termed, employ an NIT."'
The NIT was "deployed on the [target website]" and "aug-
ment[ed] that content with additional computer instructions.
When a user's computer successfully download[ed] those instruc-
tions . . . the NIT . . . caused the user's 'activating' computer to
transmit certain information to a computer controlled by or
known to the government."1 52 The NIT then revealed identifying
information to the government including: the activating comput-
er's IP address, the type of operating system running on the com-
puter (e.g., Windows), the "host name," the operating system
username, and the MAC address." The NIT was covertly passed
from the website onto any computer-wherever located"'-that
logged into the website by entering a username and password,
which in turn sent the identifying information to the government
controlled computer."'5 This was a prototypical watering hole or
drive-by-download tactic, whereby agents injected malware onto
the website, so that when internet users accessed the site, the
malware would be passed onto the website's visitor and the gov-
ernment could retrieve identifying information from that user's
computer.1 5 6
Ostensibly, the warrant requested to search an unlimited
number of unidentified computers-wherever located-but never-
theless, on February 20, 2015, a magistrate judge in the Eastern
150. Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 12.
151. See id. at 11-12, 22-23. This is important in analyzing "reasonable expectations of
privacy." See infra Part VI.
152. Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148 at 24.
153. See id. at 25.
154. Id. at 29. Although the warrant application repeatedly refers to the fact that the
government-controlled computer and website are operated from the Eastern District of
Virginia, scrupulous review reveals that page 29 of the warrant application is the only
place that agents imply that searches potentially will take place outside the issuing dis-
trict. See id.
155. Id. at 26.
156. See supra Part II.B (discussing watering hole or drive-by-download tactics).
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District of Virginia authorized the search warrant.1 5 7 At the time,
the website boasted 215,000 members, and pursuant to a single
warrant, agents cast the NIT out into the sea of alleged sus-
pects.' A remarkable 1300 IP addresses were returned, and
armed with this information, agents all over the country secured
a second warrant to search residences and arrest suspects. 15 The
charges filed stemmed from this one warrant issued in the East-
ern District of Virginia and led to an "escalating stream" of cases
in nearly every state."o
B. Defendants Challenged the Validity of the Warrant Across the
Country
The government employed its clandestine search methods on a
massive scale, using technology that was ahead of constitutional
law. Defendants filed motions to suppress, forcing federal district
courts across the country to confront serious and complex legal
issues for which there is no controlling circuit or Supreme Court
precedent."' Courts came to markedly different conclusions,
which will stand until further guidance can be offered by circuit
courts and eventually, the Supreme Court.162
Nearly every district court found that the magistrate issuing
the warrant exceeded her jurisdictional authority, and therefore,
violated Rule 41(b).' Three jurisdictions suppressed all fruits of
157. Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 1.
158. Cox, supra note 149; Nakashima, supra note 145.
159. Cox, supra note 149; e.g., Nakashima, supra note 145.
160. E.g., Cox, supra note 149 (quoting Colin Fieman, a public defender handling sev-
eral cases).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351-RJB, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11033, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016); see also Montemayor, supra note 144
(quoting a Twin Cities attorney who has monitored Operation Pacifier cases across the
country, stating that "[t]his is the place where constitutional law has not caught up with
changes in technology").
162. E.g., United States v. Broy, No. 16-CR-10030, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128616, at
*1-2 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016).
163. See, e.g., id. at *24; United States v. Croghan, No. 1:15-CR-48, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 127479, at *18 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016); United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-
285, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122086, at *16-17 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (refusing to en-
gage in judicial "finesse" to find the defendants had an "ethereal presence" in Virginia);
United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105471, at *20 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 10, 2016); United States v. Werdene, No. 15-434, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66311, at
*2-3 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2016); United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *22 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016); United States v. Levin, No. 15-
10271, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52907, at *17 (D. Mass. Apr. 20, 2016); Michaud, 2016 U.S.
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the NIT Warrant. 6 4 A number of other courts found the NIT may
have been unlawful, but suppression was unwarranted under the
good faith exception; and three decisions from the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia and one from the Western District of Arkansas
found that the magistrate acted within prescribed bounds of au-
thority."' However, any discussion of the jurisdictional require-
ments under Rule 41 must be set aside given the recent amend-
ments. What remains is the courts' splintered analysis of Fourth
Amendment requirements as they apply to NIT warrants.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDGES CONSIDERING
REMOTE ACCESS WARRANTS
"Ponder and deliberate before you make a move." 16 6
It is crucial for the Fourth Amendment to keep stride with the
inexorable pace of technology, or its protections will invariably be
jettisoned. The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... particular-
ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."' 6 These words, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, require three things to avoid amounting to an invalid war-
rant:6"' (1) "warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested
magistrates," (2) "those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to
the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence
sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a
particular offense," and (3) "warrants must particularly describe
Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *19. But see United States v. Jean, No. 5:15-CR-50087-001, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123869, at *56 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 13, 2016) (holding that the warrant
complied with Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. Matish, No. 4:16-CR-16, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82279, at *58-59 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2016) (holding that the warrant complied with
Rule 41(b)(4)); United States v. Darby, No. 2:16-CR-36, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960, at
*36 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2016) (holding that the warrant did not violate Rule 41(b)).
164. Croghan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127479, at *22; Arterbury, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67092, at *1 (adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to suppress evidence aris-
ing from the NIT warrant); Levin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52907, at *40.
165. See Croghan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127479, at *7-8.
166. TZU, supra note 1, at 49.
167. U.S. CONsT. amend. TV.
168. See Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop., 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961), for a sum-
mary of events in England and the early colonies that provided the background for the
Fourth Amendment. The colonists abhorred unrestricted power of search and seizure
which amounted to wide ranging "general warrants." Id. at 728.
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the things to be seized as well as the place to be searched."' Feder-
al law enforcement must satisfy these requirements to obtain a
warrant for remote access searches, regardless of the information
sought, because individuals have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in any electronic device that stores personal information.
Further, the surreptitious process of an NIT amounts to both a
search and a seizure of the device.
A. The Fourth Amendment Protects An Individual's "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy"
Courts must decide whether inserting the NIT into computers
is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, even when the only
information sought is the discovery of IP addresses and other lim-
ited system related characteristics. The protections of the Fourth
Amendment are preconditioned on whether the person invoking
its guarantees can claim a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate
"expectation of privacy" in the place or thing to be
searched.' This invokes two discrete inquiries: (1) whether the
individual, by his conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy," and (2) "whether the individual's subjec-
tive expectation of privacy is 'one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable.""" Therefore, the focal point is not on the
items found, but rather on the area searched when inquiring
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. 7 '
The caveat is that anything a person knowingly exposes to the
public or voluntarily turns over to third parties is not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection, and can be acquired without a
warrant."' E-mail and internet users have been found to have no
expectation of privacy in their e-mail addresses or the IP ad-
dresses of websites they visit because this information is inher-
169. E.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (collecting cases).
171. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan J., concurring)).
172. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980); United States v. Horowitz,
806 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir. 1986)..
173. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43 (holding no Fourth Amendment protection for phone
numbers dialed and stored by phone company); cf. Katz, 389 U.S at 351-52 (finding priva-
cy protection for phone calls placed in a public phone booth). The government can also ac-
quire, without a warrant, items such as personal bank records. See United States v. Mil-
ler, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976).
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ently provided to and used by ISP."' By contrast, jurisprudence
underscores that an expectation of privacy exists in one's cell
phone or personal computer because a search of such items would
"expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive
search of a house."'
B. The District Courts Have Split on Whether Operation Pacifier's
NIT Constituted a Search
Courts are split on whether the Operation Pacifier NIT
amounted to a search or not because they differ regarding wheth-
er the "expectation of privacy" inquiry is aimed at the object of
the search, the computer, or at the information obtained, the IP
address."' Some courts followed a pen register analogy to find
that the warrant in Operation Pacifier was not needed because IP
addresses are exposed to third parties and are not private."' One
court went as far as finding there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in an IP address or a personal computer when agents are
174. E.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Alba v. United States,
555 U.S. 908 (2008); see also In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600, 612 n.12 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the expectation of privacy is absent in IP ad-
dresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and addressing information on the envelopes,
to support the conclusion that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site da-
ta).
175. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014); United States v. Otero,
563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (2009) (stating "the personal computer and its ability to store and in-
termingle a huge array of one's personal papers in a single place increases law enforce-
ment's ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person's private affairs,
and accordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important").
176. Compare United States v. Broy, No. 16-CR-10030, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128616,
at *16 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016) (finding the defendant had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his computer, and thus, the NIT constituted a search), and United States v. Ad-
ams, No. 6:16-CR-11, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105471, at *13-14 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016),
with United States v. Henderson, No. 15-CR-00565-WHO-1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118608, at *12-15 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding no expectation of privacy in the IP ad-
dress, and thus, the FBI could have legally discovered this information absent the NIT
warrant), and United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11033, at *20-22 (N.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (likening the IP address to an unlisted tele-
phone number and concluding the FBI could have obtained this without the NIT process).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Werdene, No. 15-434, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66311,
*24-26 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2016); Michaud, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *20-23; Unit-
ed States v. Matish, No. 4:16CR16, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *70-71 (E.D. Va. June
21, 2016); United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105195, at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (concluding defendant had no expectation of
privacy in his IP address while acknowledging that the FBI obtained defendant's IP ad-
dress from his computer, not from a third party).
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executing an NIT warrant.'7 ' That same court reasoned that the
FBI exploiting a vulnerability by hacking a computer is akin to
simply peering through broken blinds in an apartment.1 7 1
Still other courts found that (1) a Tor user has effectively dis-
guised his IP address; (2) the NIT is necessary in order to discov-
er this information; and (3) this is accomplished by surreptitious-
ly planting malware on a defendant's computer.' These courts
found that when agents inserted code onto the computers, they
invaded the defendants' expectation of privacy in their comput-
ers."' In large part, the disparity in deciding this issue is due to a
misunderstanding of anonymization technologies like the Tor
network, and how the NIT functions.'8 2
C. Inserting NIT Code into A Computer Amounts to Both A
"Search" and A "Seizure"
Agents deploying an NIT are initiating a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment for three reasons. First,
agents engage in a search when they use an NIT to discover a
hidden IP address because, unlike an IP address obtained from a
third party Internet service provider,'8 3 the FBI is only able to re-
veal the user's IP address by means of the NIT-and not through
the traditional public look-up or subpoena served on a third par-
ty.18 It is erroneous to conclude that when the IP address passes
178. See Matish, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *66-67, *73, *77 (reasoning that "in
today's digital world, it appears to be a virtual certainty that computers accessing the In-
ternet can-and eventually will-be hacked," and therefore, there is no expectation of pri-
vacy in a computer).
179. Id. at *80. But see Broy, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128616, at *17-18 ("Using the NIT
to 'exploit a vulnerability in the online network' is not akin to police merely peering
through broken blinds; it is akin to the police breaking the blinds and then peering
through them.").
180. See, e.g., United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67091, at *28-30 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016); United States v. Darby, No. 2:16CR36, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960, at *17-19 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2016); United States v. Torres, No.
5:16-CR-285, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122086, at *9-10 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016); United
States v. Ammons, No. 3:16-CR-00011, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124503, at *2 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 14, 2016).
181. See, e.g., Arterbury, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *28-30; see also supra note
180 and accompanying sources.
182. See, e.g., Michaud, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *21 (likening obtaining de-
fendant's IP address to an unlisted telephone number); Cox, supra note 147.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
184. Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 11-12, 22-23; Arterbury, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *29 n.10; see also United States v. Jean, No. 5:15-CR-50087-
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through the first Tor node, a disclosure to a third party occurs
because it is one of thousands of randomly routed nodes in the
Tor network and each node only knows its successor and prede-
cessor-not the original sender."' Agents would still need to de-
ploy the NIT in order to discover computer system information.1 7
Indeed, the FBI admits in its application the inability to discover
the IP addresses and their dependence on the NIT.' Thus, a
computer user's identifying information no longer falls within the
category of information "disclosed to third parties" when employ-
ing anonymization technology, and therefore, the FBI must se-
cure a warrant before executing an NIT.'" Kyllo v. United States
holds that when the government uses a device that is not in gen-
eral public use, to discover information that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveil-
lance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.8 0 Remotely deploying computer malware may fairly be
categorized as not in general public use, and requires judicial au-
thorization. A contrary determination would open the door to
unmitigated government surveillance that would circumvent so-
ciety's privacy measures.
Second, executing an NIT is a search because when NIT code is
planted on a dark website that is accessed by a user whose ad-
dress is disguised through Tor, the NIT in reality does more than
simply discover the IP address. Specifically, this is because (1) by
001, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123869, at *28 n.14 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 13, 2016) (noting that the
IP address was not obtained from a third party).
185. United States v. Werdene, No. 15-434, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66311, at *27 (E.D.
Pa. May 18, 2016).
186. Owen & Savage, supra note 50, at 1; Dingledine et al., supra note 52, at 1.
187. This is because deanonymizing Tor users requires advanced technical capabilities
and an immense amount of time. See Caliskan et al., supra note 38, at 13-15.
188. Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 11-12, 22-23.
189. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the
IP address was obtained from PacBell's connection facility, and in United States v. Caira,
the IP address was obtained from Microsoft by subpoena. Id.; 833 F.3d 803, 805-09 (7th
Cir. 2016). These are prominent distinctions of how an IP address is obtained through use
of an NIT. This in turn alters the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis because a
third party cannot provide officers with a Tor user's system identifying information.
190. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Although Kyllo involved officers
using thermovision to see through the walls of a home, a search of a computer or cell
phone is likely far more threatening. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014)
("[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house.").
191. Additionally, a proliferation of illegal activity, like hacking and computer abuse,
should not form the basis of "in general public use" in order to allow agents to forego war-
rant requirements.
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using Tor a user does not disclose their IP address, so even the IP
address is private, and (2) by obtaining the user's IP address as a
result of the user triggering the NIT on the illicit web page, the
FBI is able to connect the address to the incriminating web page.
As a result, the FBI obtains the confidential fact that the IP ad-
dress holder sought specific information.1 2 This makes an NIT
less like a pen register (a device that records numbers dialed from
a phone line)'93 and more like a wiretap, which would disclose
that the suspect sold child porn on the phone call.'94
Third, the Fourth Amendment protects property as well as pri-
vacy,"' and an NIT is a search because the NIT code "physically
occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation.""' In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that
the government's installation of a GPS device on a target vehicle
was a search because the device occupied physical space for the
purpose of obtaining information."' Similarly, in Florida v.
Jardines the Court found that an officer and his drug-sniffing ca-
nine simply standing on the porch of a residence to detect the
presence of narcotics was a search because the officer physically
entered a private area to engage in conduct not authorized by the
homeowner.'
The NIT in Operation Pacifier was malware code written into a
web page and passed onto a user's computer." The contents of a
computer is simply code, and just like attaching a GPS device to a
car in Jones, the code of an NIT occupies physical space on a
computer, which is constitutionally protected property,"' and the
192. See Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 5 (declaring that the NIT
will reveal "the 'activating' computer's actual IP address, and the date and time that the
NIT determines what the IP address is"). By definition, if the NIT is triggered and the IP
address revealed, the user has visited the dark web page.
193. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (defining a pen register as a me-
chanical device, usually installed at a telephone facility, that records the numbers dialed
on a telephone but does not record communications or whether the call was completed).
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2016) (defining "intercept" to mean "the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device").
195. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
196. Id.; see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
197. 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
198. 133 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
199. See Cova et al., supra note 76, at 281; Rid & Buchanan, supra note 62, at 16.
200. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014); United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d
1127, 1132 (2009).
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NIT serves the purpose of obtaining information not authorized
by the owner. Indeed, at least one district court followed this ra-
tionale and reasoned that the trespassory nature of inserting NIT
code onto the computers of those who visit a web page constitutes
a search .
Finally, an NIT also constitutes a temporary seizure of a user's
computer. United States v. Place instructs that a seizure does oc-
cur when, without consent, agents temporarily take private prop-
erty to conduct a search.202 Place stands for the principle that gov-
ernment control of private property does not have to be
permanent to be a seizure. Just as the luggage in Place was
seized, so too is a target computer seized with NIT malware, be-
cause once the user visits the watering hole, the web page forces
the computer to download the NIT code, store it, and execute the
malicious application, which controls the computer and directs it
to return system identifying information to FBI agents. 20 3 By tak-
ing control of a user's computer, even temporarily, to direct it to
provide information unobtainable in any other way, the NIT seiz-
es the computer without authorization from the user.204
It is the object of the search that is pertinent, not the infor-
mation obtained.2 05 The fact that an internet user may not have
an expectation of privacy in an IP address is of no relevance be-
cause the NIT process involved in obtaining that information in-
volves invading a computer and planting code that occupies
space, which seizes control of the device in order to compel it to
reveal its identifying information. Thus, agents must satisfy
201. See United States v. Darby, No. 2:16CR36, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960, at *19
(E.D. Va. June 3, 2016).
202. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005)
(holding that a canine sniff on the exterior of the vehicle during a traffic violation stop
does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it is within the scope of the stop and re-
veals no more than the presence of illegal contraband).
203. See Lu et al., supra note 76, at 440-41; see also Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant,
supra note 148, at 24-25. The argument that an NIT is more like a lawful "canine-sniff'
because it merely detects the presence of contraband, breaks down because unlike detect-
ing the presence of narcotics in luggage clearly in plain view, neither a user's computer
nor the IP address is exposed to public view at the time of the search. See Place, 462 U.S.
at 697-98, 707.
204. See United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at
*30; Darby, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960, at *18-19.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir. 1986); Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980). For example, an individual does not have a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle. See United States v. Soto, 779 F. Supp. 2d
208, 218 (2011). However, when government action invades a home to search for that ve-
hicle, a warrant is required. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
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Fourth Amendment proscriptions for obtaining a warrant prior to
executing remote access searches.
VI. ANALYZING PROBABLE CAUSE AND PARTICULARITY FOR "NIT"
WARRANT APPLICATIONS
"[I]n the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together."206
A search warrant that authorizes an NIT to be launched from a
website is not a search of one or two computers; it implicates
thousands of internet users' electronic devices. The gravity of the
search is compounded by the reality that the targets of the search
are unknown, and therefore the website itself, as the only known
factor, must play a substantial role in the Fourth Amendment
analysis.07 Deliberation and forethought is vital to making a nar-
row determination that there is probable cause for each internet
user that may potentially visit the site in question. This involves
considering whether there are legal or innocuous purposes for vis-
iting the site, as well as the potential for searching unintentional
visitors. Should a magistrate reasonably determine that each us-
er visiting the website is engaged in the unlawful activity, then a
single warrant to search thousands of computers is justified.2 08
A. The Warrant Requirements: Probable Cause & Particularity in
Operation Pacifier
The underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment have two inter-
ests at heart. First, because "any intrusion in the way of a search
or seizure is an evil," the probable cause requirement permits on-
ly those searches founded on a careful predetermination that evi-
206. TZU, supra note 1, at 54.
207. Scholars have offered that the particularity requirement should apply to internet
users, not accounts, because the suspect is the one constant in the physical and virtual
world. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Ap-
proach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1045-46 (2010). However, if the suspects are unknown, and
the website allows for criminals and naive users to access the site, the website becomes
the driving force for determining probable cause, which will govern the requisite particu-
larity.
208. Information that cocaine dealers will be making sales among the spectators at a
sports arena would hardly justify searching each member of the crowd. Likewise, presence
at a dark website, without more, is unlikely to establish probable cause.
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dence, instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, or contraband will be
found.20 9 Second, to prevent the "exploratory rummaging in a per-
son's belongings,"2 1 0 the particularity requirement ensures that a
search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not
become "the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers in-
tended to prohibit."2 1 ' These two requirements are intertwined
and work in tandem to limit law enforcement's authorization to
search in specific areas, for specific things in which there is prob-
able cause to search.
The probable cause component is a fluid concept, which turns
"on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual con-
texts."2 1 2 By contrast, the requisite particularity for a warrant is
more exacting. The warrant must set out with "particular[ity] . . .
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."2 12
The calculus for determining probable cause is then an inquiry
applied to each place to be searched and each item to be seized.2 1 4
"The NIT Warrant [in Operation Pacifier] describes particular
places to be searched-computers that have logged into [the web-
site]-for which there was probable cause to search."2 1 5 The courts
consistently found that the scope of probable cause satisfied the
particularity of the warrant given the alarming and pervasive
content of the website."' In large part this was due to the "nu-
209. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Warden, Md. Peniten-
tiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967).
210. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
211. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
212. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). An inherent realization should be that
innocent behavior often will provide the basis for probable cause, otherwise a more strin-
gent standard would be imposed than our security demands. See id. at 243 n.13. But see
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (discussing how the fact that a scenario "looked
suspicious" was not enough).
213. See CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A) (a warrant "must identify the
person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized").
214. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84.
215. United States v. Darby, No. 2:16CR36, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960, at *27-28
(E.D. Va. June 3, 2016) (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Broy, No. 16-CR-
10030, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128616, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016); United States v.
Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-05351, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *9-12 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28,
2016).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Matish, No. 4:16CR16, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at
*33-37 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2016); United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105195, at *22 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (noting that the particu-
larity argument has been rejected by nearly every court to consider it). But see In re War-
rant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 755-
58 (2013) (finding a warrant to "surreptitiously install0 software designed ... to extract
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merous affirmative steps" and "the complicated machinations
through which users had to go to access the web site (meaning
that unintentional users were unlikely to stumble onto it)."2 1 7
B. Probable Cause and Particularity Regarding Unknown
Computer Users
There is untold investigative potential in executing NIT war-
rants, and with the best intentions it could be used to thwart for-
eign and domestic terrorist plots and large scale attacks on Unit-
ed States' economic interests. Our society ought to aggressively
pursue all such crimes, particularly those such as the appalling
crimes involving child abuse imagery. However, viewing online
child pornography is a one-of-kind crime because merely access-
ing the website may constitute culpable activity.2 18 Regardless of
the crime being investigated, courts must be cautious about the
precedent set regarding how broadly the FBI can use NIT tech-
nology. In Operation Pacifier agents used a child pornography
website to search thousands of unknown computers across the
nation with a single warrant, but this tactic could easily be uti-
lized on more benign websites. This result can be avoided by
evaluating the website in the same way a determination would be
made to search all persons inside a large building where there is
ongoing suspected illegal activity.
1. The "All Persons" Warrant
The government's use of a watering hole to deploy an NIT rep-
resents the vanguard of the FBI's hacking campaign. A single
warrant to search so broadly is unheard of.21 9 However, there is a
stringent, albeit rare, scenario in the case of physical searches
certain stored electronic records" from "an unknown computer at an unknown location" did
not satisfy Fourth Amendment particularity requirement).
217. See United States v. Epich, No. 15-CR-163, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32459, at *3
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016); Matish, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82279, at *33, *37; Michaud,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *14 (stating that it "would be highly unlikely that Web-
site A would be stumbled upon").
218. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2012) (establishing the crime to "knowingly
access, with intent to view ... child pornography").
219. See Cox, supra note 149 (quoting Christopher Soghoian, principle technologist at
the ACLU). "We're talking about the government hacking thousands of computers, pursu-
ant to a single warrant,"-likely the largest law enforcement hacking campaign to date.
Id.
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that can be applied to NIT warrants, known as the "all persons"
warrant. The seminal case to present the viability of a warrant to
search all persons found at a given location was State v. De
Simone.2 0 That case involved a warrant to search a vehicle and
"all persons found therein" for lottery slips. 2 1 The De Simone
court upheld the conviction and forged the following language
that is quoted by numerous jurisdictions:
On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search persons iden-
tified only by their presence at a specified place should depend upon
the facts. A showing that lottery slips are sold in a department store
or an industrial plant obviously would not justify a warrant to search
every person on the premises, for there would be no probable cause
to believe that everyone there was participating in the illegal opera-
tion. On the other hand, a showing that a dice game is operated in a
manhole or in a barn should suffice, for the reason that the place is
so limited and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that eve-
ryone present is a party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not
only probable cause but also a designation of the persons to be
searched which functionally is as precise as a dimensional portrait of
them ....
So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone
present at the anticipated scene will probably be a participant, pres-
ence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth
Amendment. The evil of the general warrant is thereby negated. To
insist nonetheless that the individual be otherwise described when
circumstances will not permit it, would simply deny government a
needed power to deal with crime without advancing the interest the
222Amendment was meant to serve.
Although the "all persons" warrant has never directly been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court,223 the issue of a warrant to search
"all persons" has since been addressed in approximately forty-
three jurisdictions, with eight holding that it was unconstitution-
al, and at least another thirty following the De Simone ra-
220. 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1972).
221. Id. at 850.
222. Id. at 850-51 (emphasis added). For a collection of cases quoting De Simone, see
Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 1996); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d
1186, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Guadarrama, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207-
08 (E.D. Wis. 2001); State v. Boyer, 967 So. 2d 458, 465 (La. 2007).
223. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 88-89, 92 n.4 (1979). In Ybarra, a warrant was
issued to search a bartender and one other person, at a tavern where there was substan-
tial drug activity. Id. at 87-89. Police proceeded to pat down all within the bar. Id. at 88.
The court held the search was unconstitutional because "a warrant to search a place can-
not normally be construed to authorize a search of each individual in that place." Id. at 92
n.4.
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tionale. 2 4 De Simone's rationale has also been endorsed by lead-
ing constitutional scholars, reasoning that a search for "all per-
sons present" at a given location may be constitutional following
cautious review of the nature of the location and the unlawful ac-
tivity.225
For example, in State v. Hinkel, a warrant was upheld for the
search of "all persons on the premises" of an "afterhours joint" be-
cause probable cause supported that "[t]here was little likelihood
that anyone would be in the house but to participate in the after-
hours revelry."2 26 Similarly, warrants have been upheld to search
"any and all persons found upon said premises .. . with the excep-
tion of people who may arrive upon or be upon said premises in a
regular course of business, (i.e., postman, delivery people)" be-
cause there was probable cause that evidence of a crime would be
found through a search of anyone present at the defendant's resi-
dence at the time of the search.227
In stark contrast, the Ninth Circuit addressed the search of an
entire Gypsy Church rejecting the "den of thieves" argument to
justify a search of all persons simply because they were there.
The court found that the warrant was insufficiently particular
because it permitted a search of "any persons on the premises,"
which would have included innocent children and family mem-
bers.228 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa deemed a warrant
to search "[a]ll persons located inside the premises" to be over-
broad despite that the reputation of the bar "is such that no local
people would enter without the intention to purchase or sell con-
trolled substances."2 29 The court reasoned that "it is a legal-
ly operated, legitimate business ... it is still quite possible some-
one from out of town or new to the area could stop in to ask
directions, use a pay phone, or make a legal purchase." 2 30 Even
224. See Guadarrama, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1207, n.3-4. Further, three states have held
or expressed in dicta that "all persons" warrants are unconstitutional general warrants;
five other jurisdictions find that such warrants do not provide a sufficiently particular de-
scription under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1207.
225. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.5(e) (5th ed. Oct. 2016) (endorsing the limited rationale outlined in De
Simone as the proper analysis for "all persons present" warrants).
226. 365 N.W.2d 774, 775-77 (Minn. 1985).
227. State v. Allard, 674 A.2d 921, 922-23 (Me. 1996).
228. Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1015, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1996). The affidavit only
supported probable cause to search two individuals). Id. at 1028.
229. State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 665-66 (Iowa 1995).
230. Id.
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warrants to search "any and all vehicles and persons present at
the scene" of a residence allegedly engaged in ongoing drug sales
and use have been struck down because this implicates "every
vehicle at a family home, during daytime hours, when unsuspect-
ing friends, neighbors, or laborers could be present."231
De Simone and similar cases addressing a warrant to search
"all persons" at a given place support the proposition that even
ongoing and pervasive criminal conduct at a suspected location
does not negate the fact that law abiding citizens may be engaged
in legal activities at the locality. Yet in certain circumstances a
warrant may be issued to search "all persons" found on a premis-
es-persons who ultimately are unknown at the time of issu-
ance.2" However, the risk that an innocent person may be swept
up in a dragnet search is a part of the careful calculus of the
Fourth Amendment's requirements.23 3
C. Limiting the Sting of Rule 41-Applying De Simone to
Applications for NIT Warrants
De Simone takes into consideration the reality that a search of
everyone found on a premises will likely include law abiding citi-
zens, and accounts for this by requiring an expansive scope of the
probable cause element to justify equally broad particularity. The
Supreme Court has recognized that digital devices, like cell
phones, are "capable of storing and accessing a quantity of infor-
mation, some highly personal, that no person would ever have
had on his person in hard-copy form."234 For this reason, the same
considerations and requirements of an "all persons" search should
apply with equal force in the search of "all computers" visiting a
target website because presumably innocent parties may be
caught in the government's watering hole search tactic. Courts
are willing to require probable cause that evidence of a crime will
231. United States v. Swift, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055, 1057-58 (E.D. Ark. 2010).
232. See State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774, 777-76; Allard, 674 A.2d at 922-23.
233. See United States v. Guadarrama, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (E.D. Wis. 2001)
(stating, "the question is whether there is sufficient particularity in the probable cause
sense, that is, whether the information supplied the magistrate supports the conclusion
that it is probable anyone in the described place when the warrant is executed is involved
in the criminal activity in such a way as to have evidence thereof on his person") (quoting
LAFAVE, supra note 225).
234. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495, 2496 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
2017]1 765
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
likely be found on each person found on the premises,2 35 and thus,
the same standard should apply to "all computers" accessing a
dark website because the later, a search of one's computer, is like-
ly to be an even more invasive search.2 36
Agents deploying NITs, or malware techniques, from a website
in a watering hole scenario should be required to demonstrate
that the unlawful website content is of such a pervasive nature,
like a site dedicated to child pornography, that it is extremely un-
likely that one would enter for an innocuous purpose. Many sites
may fall into the repugnant category and others may contain un-
palatable chat groups or comment feeds, but a site often is not en-
tirely devoid of lawful purpose. The potential for innocent and le-
gal activity on any given site, as well as, the potential for
inadvertent visitors, must be taken into consideration. "[A] per-
son's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of crim-
inal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person."237 It follows that a person's mere presence on
a website is unlikely to afford probable cause to search their com-
puter. Tribunals must determine the overt and conscious acts re-
quired to access the site, even for a site that is so rife with illegal
purpose. This ensures that happenstance does not ensnare the
unsuspecting internet surfer in the ploy of an NIT search war-
rant.
Secondly, in investigations involving a botnet controlled by a
master, a search of all computers unknowingly infected with the
malware will hardly be grounds for probable cause, given that a
botnet is by definition-controlled by one or a few criminals.238
The mere fact that one's computer has been commandeered by a
botmaster to perpetuate online crime does not support probable
cause to search each computer because this does not constitute
involvement in unlawful activity. Searching botnet victims would
be analogous to searching recently liberated victims of a hostage
situation and filing charges based on the evidence obtained.
235. See, e.g., Swift, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (citing Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 276
(4th Cir. 2004)).
236. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 ("[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.").
237. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
62-63 (1968)).
238. See supra Part II.D.
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A warrant in a botnet investigation is only likely to be author-
ized for the purpose of the government removing malware from
the infected computer, and the scope of such a warrant will not
permit agents to rummage through the hard drive of each com-
puter. Many may be innocently and involuntarily linked to the
master of the botnet, and such a nexus does not warrant an "all
computers" search.
D. Recommended Criteria for Evaluating a Search of "All
Computers"Accessing a Site
An "all computers" search warrant should be "authorized under
the Fourth Amendment only if the supporting affidavit establish-
es probable cause that evidence of illegal activity will [likely] be
found upon every person to fall within the warrant's scope at the
time of execution."239 Warrants that pass constitutional muster
will likely only reach those engaged in culpable online activity.
First, in order for government agents to deploy an NIT, the site
should be hidden, unavailable through a general Google search,
or bear an apparently offensive URL. This is necessary to prevent
stumbling upon the site,240 and triggering the NIT search upon
merely landing on the homepage. Second, the site to be injected
with malware should be one that requires registration or an in-
vite from website members. Third, the website must serve an os-
tensibly illegal purpose and the content purporting to do so must
be pervasive throughout the site.
Fourth, and most importantly, agents should reasonably limit
the scope and probability of ensnaring those stumbling upon the
site by planting the NIT code, not on the home page, but further
within the website so that an individual's happenstance encoun-
ter with the site does not trigger the search. Agents must embed
the malware code deeper within the website.24 ' These four re-
quirements would operate similarly to the minimization require-
239. See Swift, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. Those concerned about the government's reach
under Rule 41 can rest assured because if this standard is followed, warrants likely to sat-
isfy these standards are few.
240. See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 62, at 16.
241. Suggested options may include the images portion of a web page, or in the case of
online black markets, at the checkout page. In this manner, there is good reason to believe
that at that point an individual has no longer mistakenly visited the site, but engaged in
illegal activity and overtly moved to complete the crime.
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ments for wiretap surveillance,2 4 2 to ensure that like wiretaps,
NITs "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize" the num-
ber of computers subject to search. 24 3 These four factors are indi-
cia of probable cause to believe that each user accessing the tar-
get site is involved in the illegal activity.
This criterion should find favor with the courts as well as the
critics of Rule 41 because it allows law enforcement to efficiently
search for evasive online criminal activity, while still protecting
the interests of those naively or curiously searching the Internet.
For example, similar to a bar with a reputation for attracting rep-
rehensible characters who distribute narcotics,2 44 a jihadi website
may well offer unlawful services and discuss egregious acts. How-
ever, just as the bar may occasionally provide a patron with the
opportunity to make a legal purchase, so too does a facially unset-
tling website provide a resource for journalists and researchers
alike. 2 45 This militates in favor of requiring that probable cause be
demonstrated for each person that will visit a website deploying
an NIT.246
Rule 41(b)(6) affords the potential for limitless reach. There is
little recourse for Fourth Amendment violations due to substan-
tial social costs, and excluding evidence "has always been [the
courts'] last resort, not [its] first impulse."2 47 Considering that
warrant applications are conducted ex parte, the mantle then
242. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 435 (1977) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§
2518(3)(a-d) (2012)).
The issuing judge may approve an intercept application if it is determined
that normal investigative techniques failed or are unlikely to succeed and
there is probable cause to believe that: (i) an individual is engaged in crimi-
nal activity; (ii) particular communications concerning the offense will be ob-
tained through interception; and (iii) the target facilities are being used in
connection with the specified criminal activity).
See id.
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012).
244. See State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 665-66 (Iowa 1995).
245. By definition, agents will be unable to determine if the computers being searched
belong to a newspaper or media station given that many journalists' computers are "con-
cealed through technological means." See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A); see also Caliskan et
al., supra note 38, at 24 (listing a myriad of groups who conceal the location of their com-
puters); Jardine, supra note 36, at 5 (articulating that anonymity is part of a journalists
"survival kit").
246. Inadvertently searching computers used for newsgathering would likely contra-
vene statutory authority. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2012),
passed in response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
247. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
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rests on the judiciary at the outset to protect Fourth Amendment
interests and curtail NIT warrants that seek to overreach. Oth-
erwise, the FBI's methods could easily extend to searches
launched from progressive Islamic and jihadi websites, but there
are legitimate reasons journalists and reporters visit such sites
while using anonymization technology.2 48 Magistrates must pro-
ceed with caution and target their Fourth Amendment inquiry on
the circumstances surrounding the website. A careful evaluation
must be undertaken as to the mechanics, nature and content of
the site to ensure that there is indeed probable cause to search
potentially every computer in the nation that visits the site in
question."'
E. The Means of Executing the Remote Access Warrant Must Be
Reasonable
Even when agents have properly secured a warrant to conduct
a search, the method of entry is one factor to be considered in as-
sessing the reasonableness of a search and/or seizure.2 50 Wilson v.
Layne instructs that even if agents hold a valid warrant, when it
is executed with third parties present who do not aid in the exe-
cution of the warrant a search may be rendered unreasonable.25 '
Executing an NIT differs from simply entering into a home.
Malware hacking technology is not perfect, and the process in-
volves law enforcement exploiting vulnerabilities in a system.252
When law enforcement opts for this practice they risk allowing
criminals to hijack legitimate government searches or reverse en-
gineer government malware.25' For example, in 2011 the largest
248. See, e.g., Jardine, supra note 36, at 5.
249. If the search will involve capturing video or similar forms of surveillance, more
exacting Fourth Amendment standards outside those outlined in this piece should be ap-
plied. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1987)
(adopting constitutional standards for such surveillance by borrowing from the statute
permitting wiretaps-Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012)).
250. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
251. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611-14 (1999) (involving reporters invited to wit-
ness the search); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 809-10 (1999) (involving a media "ride
along").
252. See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 62, at 16; INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT,
supra note 64, at 62-63.
253. See Ron Wyden, Matt Blaze, & Susan Landau, The Feds Will Soon Be Able to Le-
gally Hack Almost Anyone, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
2016/09/government-will-soon-able-legally-hack-anyone/ (providing examples of hackers
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European hacker club reverse engineered a lawful interception
malware program to provide a functional backdoor to anyone on
the Internet, which allowed hackers to remotely control comput-
ers and activate microphones and cameras.254 This not only jeop-
ardizes the security of those searched but puts government
search tools in the hands of criminals who can then turn them on
government and private sector computer systems.2 55
By creating doors that other hackers can use, the FBI's NIT
malware creates a scenario far more unreasonable than just invit-
ing the media for a ride along.256 This situation is more like the
FBI offering tours of the investigation scene to those passing by
and handing out copies of the keys to the front door as they come
through. If the risks of executing malware are properly under-
stood, this is more than a policy problem; it's a Fourth Amend-
ment problem that should govern the execution of remote access
warrants.
However, while criminals still have to find the back door creat-
ed by agents, the government may have created a permanent
open-door policy for its agents because once the NIT code is on a
computer system-how is it removed? What capabilities does the
government have once an NIT has been deployed on a target
computer?2 . Answers to these questions are unlikely to come out
in the ex parte warrant process. Therefore, courts ought to err on
the side of caution and minimize the number of NIT warrants
getting ahold of law enforcements techniques); see also Dan Goodin, Root Backdoor Found
in Surveillance Gear Used by Law Enforcement, ARS TECHNICA (May 28, 2014, 3:11 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/05/root-backdoor-found-in-surveillance-gear-used-by-
law-enforcement/ (detailing a litany of critical weaknesses in government surveillance).
254. Chaos Computer Club Analyzes Government Malware, CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner; see also Second ACLU Com-
ment, supra note 120 at 9.
255. See Pell, supra note 28, at 532-34 (examining the dangers of creating "back doors"
in communications systems that could be exploited to allow improper access by organized
crime operations, and there "is no way to create a back door that will work only for legiti-
mate surveillance"). These same concerns apply when the "door" is surreptitiously created
by agents hacking a computer with malware.
256. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 604, 614; Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 809-10.
257. See Operation Pacifier NIT Warrant, supra note 148, at 28. This provides little
insight and states only that the "NIT will be used on the TARGET WEBSITE for not more
than 30-days." See also In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755 (S.D. Texas 2013) (explaining that here, the government's soft-
ware had the capacity to search the computer's hard drive, activate the computer's built-in
camera, generate latitude and longitude coordinates for the computer's location, and to
transmit the extracted data to FBI agents).
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granted by requiring that applications meet the prophylactic cri-
terion outlined in this comment.
CONCLUSION
"Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the
situation.""'
The judiciary faces the arduous task of familiarizing itself with
the technology involved in remotely accessing a computer through
an NIT, as NIT warrants will become much more commonplace
now that Rule 41 no longer obstructs law enforcement. Fourth
Amendment requirements will need to be strictly applied to pre-
vent combing searches across the Internet.
If the constitutional construct outlined in this comment is fol-
lowed for an all computers search, law enforcement will be suc-
cessful in capturing those engaged in illegal activities in the
shadows of the ether. This involves evaluating probable cause for
all computers visiting a website, in the same manner that proba-
ble cause would be assessed for all persons found on a premises-
by determining the potential for innocent bystanders being
caught in the search.
The scope of the crime does not necessarily need to limit the
scope of the investigation. The particularity of the warrant may
allow for a search of computers in all ninety-four districts, if
probable cause is broad enough to support this finding. This set-
tles the apprehension as to how Fourth Amendment require-
ments and Rule 41(b)(6) can coexist, while allowing law enforce-
ment to combat cybercrime on equal footing. Moreover, the online
markets for criminal paraphernalia, as well as the remote and
far-reaching cyber attacks on United States' interests will now
face duly authorized law enforcement.
Those who are engaged in internet crimes will indeed have rea-
son to fear, as law enforcement will have the tools and territorial
capacity to implement its investigations. The general populous
will not be forced to choose between privacy and security. Those
citizens seeking to remain anonymous, who have otherwise been
law abiding, may keep aspects of their lives private and will not
258. TZU, supra note 1, at 81.
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be caught in the wake of a general search. The updated Rule 41
will only result in an invasion of privacy if the judiciary departs
from Fourth Amendment precepts.
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